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Sammendrag 
Vi undersøker hvordan fordelingen av individrettete kommunale tjenester påvirker økonomisk ulikhet. 
Verdsettingen, behovsjusteringen og allokeringen av kommunale tjenester til hushold er basert på en 
modell for kommunenes økonomiske atferd. Modellen allokerer bundne kostnader og frie disponible 
inntekter til ulike tjenesteytende sektorer og målgrupper, og den skiller mellom faste og variable 
kostnader i produksjonen. For å estimere modellen kombinerer vi data fra kommunale regnskaper og 
administrative registre for perioden 1982-2013. Vi finner at økonomisk ulikhet er betydelig lavere når 
vi tar hensyn til verdien av mottatte kommunale tjenester.  Selv om de fattige mottar en relativt stor 
andel av de kommunale tjenestene, viser analysen at de kommunale tjenestene virker mindre 
utjevnende enn offentlige kontantoverføringer. Når vi undersøker utviklingen i ulikhet over tid, finner 
vi at kommunene har bidratt til å dempe økningen i inntektsulikhet gjennom reallokering av tjenester 
til lavinntektsfamilier. Denne reduksjonen i ulikhet skyldes for det meste endringer i prioriteringene 
mellom tjenestesektorer og målgrupper, og i mindre grad omfordeling av ressurser mellom 
kommunene. 
 
 
1 Introduction
In countless articles and several books, Amartya Sen has broadened the economic frameworks for
conceptualizing and measuring poverty, inequality and human development generally.1 Importantly,
focus is shifted from income inequality to economic inequality, taking note of the heterogeneities of
the individuals and of their respective nonincome circumstances (Sen, 1997, p. 385). This shift in
focus calls for broader measures of household resources that not only reﬂect cash income but also take
account of the value of in-kind transfers provided by governments, such as subsidized health care and
education. At the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge that people can diﬀer greatly in their
abilities to convert the same resources into economic well-being. For example, the elderly tend to
utilize health services more often than younger people due to diﬀerent health status, and children have
a genuine need for education.
Constructing broader measures of household resources that reﬂect in-kind transfers and diﬀerences
in needs has proven diﬃcult for several reasons. While information about aggregate spending on public
services is usually available at the national level, it can be diﬃcult to access data on local government
spending on public services. In federal systems, in-kind transfers are regularly administered by local
governments, which tend to have substantial discretion in spending priorities across service sectors
and demographic groups. Another key challenge is how to value and allocate in-kind transfers across
people, especially since prices and individual recipients are often not observed (Smeeding et al., 1993;
Aaberge and Langørgen, 2006). On top of this, the equivalence scales applied to cash income are not
necessarily appropriate when including in-kind transfers, because the receipt of public services is likely
to be associated with particular needs (Radner, 1997; Aaberge et al., 2010). These challenges have
meant that existing empirical research rarely considers the role of in-kind transfers provided by local
governments.2
In this paper, we examine how public services provided by local governments aﬀect economic
inequality by constructing a measure of household resources that reﬂects the value of in-kind transfers
and diﬀerences in needs. Our paper departs from most previous studies in that a model of local
government spending behavior is used to allocate in-kind transfers as well as to adjust for diﬀerences
in needs. Our objective is to provide a detailed picture of the distribution of extended income over the
past few decades. The term extended income denotes the sum of cash income and transfers in kind,
where in-kind transfers reﬂect the amount of local public services received by diﬀerent individuals and
households. There are a number of key questions addressed. How does the distribution of extended
income compare to the distribution of cash income? What is the relative importance of transfers in
cash and in kind in attenuating inequality in market income? To what extent do local governments
ﬁght poverty and reduce inequality by targeting in-kind transfers to vulnerable groups?
To investigate these questions, we combine Norwegian data from municipal accounts and adminis-
trative registers for the period 1982-2013. Norway provides an attractive context for this study. By
1See e.g. Sen (1985, 1992, 1997) and the review article by Atkinson (1999) of Amartya Sen's contributions to welfare
economics.
2Notable exceptions include Smeeding et al. (1993); Aaberge and Langørgen (2006); Garﬁnkel et al. (2006); Paulus
et al. (2010); Aaberge et al. (2010); Burkhauser et al. (2012); Verbist et al. (2012); Armour et al. (2013) and Figari
and Paulus (2015). However, most of these studies abstract from diﬀerences in needs, assume that the value of public
services equals the expenditures in service production, and make strong assumptions about how in-kind transfers are
allocated to households.
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linking up individuals with other family members and their tax records, we are able to measure cash
income at the household level. To estimate the model of local government spending behavior, we take
advantage of detailed local government accounts and community characteristics for every Norwegian
municipality. Norway is a sizable country with a dispersed population and relatively large public sector
where local governments play an important role in the provision of public services. There is substantial
variation in local government spending across service sectors and demographic groups (Aaberge and
Langørgen, 2003). Consequently, some municipalities may be more eﬀective than others in ﬁghting
poverty and reducing inequality, either because they can provide a generally higher level of services or
because they are targeting vulnerable groups.
From the model of local government behavior, we derive an expenditure system that proves useful
in explaining diﬀerences in spending of municipalities across goods and services and between pop-
ulation subgroups. The model distinguishes between ﬁxed and variable costs in production as well
as mandatory programmatic spending components versus discretionary spending on diﬀerent service
sectors and target groups. Our estimates suggest that economic inequality is considerably lower when
taking in-kind transfers into account. In particular, the poor beneﬁt from receiving a relatively large
share of public services. However, the equalizing eﬀect of in-kind transfers tends to be smaller than the
equalizing contribution from public cash transfers. When examining the time trends in inequality, we
ﬁnd that local governments attenuated the growth in income inequality by re-allocating in-kind trans-
fers to low-income families. This reduction in inequality is mostly due to changes in spending priorities
across service sectors and target groups, rather than re-allocation of resources across municipalities.
Taken together, our ﬁndings may have implications for both policy and research. The omission of
in-kind transfers from the standard deﬁnition of household income may call into question the validity
of comparisons of economic well-being across population subgroups, over time, and between countries.
Furthermore, this omission can have important policy implications given the wide range of policies that
aim to ﬁght poverty and reduce inequality. For these reasons, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission
stressed the importance of broadening the measures of household resources to reﬂect in-kind transfers
and diﬀerences in needs.3 Our study highlights that incorporating the value of in-kind transfers can
be empirically important for measuring economic inequality and poverty.
Our paper is related to a large and growing literature on the trends in economic inequality. This
literature documents a substantial widening of the wage structure over the past few decades. However,
there is a debate over whether the growth in market income inequality translated into a marked
increase in the disparities of economic well-being. Much of the debate revolves around how to measure
the economic resources available to households. Using data on pre-tax market income, Piketty and
Saez (2003) show that the top income shares in the U.S. have increased over the last three decades.
This ﬁnding is broadly consistent with estimates of inequality in cash income, which consider the
entire distribution and take cash transfers and taxes into account (see e.g. Burkhauser et al., 2012).
However, as the tax burden levied on households represent a deduction from their economic resources,
it is important to take account of the services which local governments provide to households through
these taxes. This concern motivates recent work by Piketty et al. (2018), who try to construct a
distributional national account. In doing so, they rely on national aggregates of spending on in-kind
3The recommendations of the commission are presented in Stiglitz et al. (2009). Broadly similar recommendations
have been made by the Canberra Group (2001), OECD (2011), Atkinson et al. (2012), and Burkhauser et al. (2012).
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transfers and public goods, making strong assumptions about how this expenditure is allocated across
people and areas (such as allocating government expenditure to individuals proportionally to disposable
income). Moreover, they abstract from diﬀerences in needs across people and heterogeneity in the
eﬃciency and provision of in-kind transfers across areas. Our ﬁndings highlight that such approaches
to constructing distributinonal national accounts may produce biased estimates of inequality and lead
to misleading conclusions about the distributional eﬀect of in-kind transfers. While these ﬁndings
could be speciﬁc to Norway, it is important to note that local governments in other countries also have
a key role in the provision of public services. Among OECD countries, for example, local government
spending make up 39 percent of all public expenditure (OECD, 2017). The corresponding ﬁgure for
Norway is 33 percent. After presenting our main results, we examine how the estimates from Norway
change if we invoke additional assumptions needed to use the data available in many other OECD
countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our data and discusses
institutional details. In Section 3, we describe the model of local government spending behavior,
present estimation results and model validation, and construct measures of extended income. Section
4 oﬀers evidence on how public services provided by local governments aﬀect economic inequality.
Section 5 provides a counterfactual analysis of factors behind the time trend in inequality. Section 6
concludes.
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2 Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 Data sources and income deﬁnitions
Our analysis combines Norwegian data from municipal accounts and administrative registers for the
period 1982-2013. For each year, we have access to administrative registers that contain records for
each individual with demographic information (including gender, date of birth, marital status, family
size and composition), socio-economic data (including income from various sources and education),
and exact geographical identiﬁers. Our measure of cash income includes earnings, self-employment
income, and all public cash transfers, from which taxes are subtracted.4 We use the term extended
income to denote the sum of cash income and the value of in-kind transfers provided through local
public services. As described in detail later, the measurement of in-kind transfers is based on detailed
local government accounts and community characteristics for every Norwegian municipality (of which
there are more than 400).
These data have several advantages over those available in most other countries. First, there is
no attrition from the original sample due to refusal by participants to consent to data sharing. In
Norway, the tax records and municipal accounts are in the public domain. Second, all Norwegian
citizens have to ﬁle a tax return (even if they have no income). As a consequence, our income data
pertain to all individuals, and not only to workers or individuals who respond to income surveys. Third,
most components of income are third-party reported, with little measurement error and without any
top or bottom coding. And fourth, unique identiﬁers allow us to match spouses to one another and
parents to children. As a result, we are able to measure income at the household level. While the
Norwegian data have many advantages, there are some challenges as well. In particular, we do not have
precise information about the allocation of in-kind transfers provided by the central government. This
includes public hospitals, higher education, transportation, defense, police and administration. As a
consequence, our paper focuses exclusively on the distributional eﬀects of in-kind transfers provided
by the local government.5
2.2 Institutional setting
In Norway, the municipalities have been assigned a major role in the provision of public services.
They are responsible for public provision of child care, education, long-term care, primary health care,
social welfare, culture, infrastructure and administration. Legislation and regulation from the central
government stipulate that diﬀerent services are targeted to diﬀerent population groups. Speciﬁcally,
the municipal service sectors (functions of government) can be classiﬁed into four diﬀerent types; (i)
services targeted toward children, (ii) services targeted toward disabled and elderly people, (iii) general
services to all residents, and (iv) means-tested social welfare services.
The services targeted towards children include primary and lower secondary education  providing
4Throughout the paper, we exclude capital income (and taxes on capital income) from our measure of cash income.
This is because tax changes have aﬀected the income reporting behavior of the tax payers, and made it diﬃcult to
construct a consistent measure of capital income over the entire period 1982-2013.
5Abstracting from in-kind transfers provided by the central government do not aﬀect our estimates of inequality and
poverty if households value these services proportionally to their extended incomes (which include cash income and the
value of in-kind transfers provided through local public services).
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mandatory education to children aged 6-15 (7-15 before 1998)  and child care which provides day-care
facilities for children aged 1-5 (1-6 before 1998). Long-term care consists of care for the elderly and
disabled. Local governments are responsible for health care provided by general practitioners, which
is regarded as a general service. Other general services are the culture sector  taking responsibility
for sports, arts, museums, libraries, cinemas and churches  and infrastructure which includes road
maintenance, municipal housing and commercial development. Social welfare includes social assistance
(means-tested cash transfers to disadvantaged families), and child welfare (child abuse cases, orphan
homes, foster care and adoption services). Social assistance is the only cash transfer that is handled
by local governments, and accounts for less than 8 percent of local government spending.
In Norway, the local governments have rather limited tax discretion. The vast majority of local tax
revenues comes from income taxes and natural resource taxes (e.g. hydropower plants), but the tax
bases as well as the tax rates are determined by the central government. These taxes should therefore
be considered as an integrated element of the centralized system of ﬁnancing, which combines local
taxes with a system of ﬁscal equalization grants and other unconditional grants from the central
government. However, local governments are allowed to collect user fees when providing infrastructure
services, child care and some nursing services. To be consistent with the institutional setting, we
therefore analyze the allocation of in-kind transfers net of user fees when deﬁning the value of in-kind
transfers.
In producing public services, local governments are constrained by regulations and laws enacted
by the central government. The detailed rules and guidelines include numerous service standards,
often related to staﬃng and personnel qualiﬁcations, entitlement legislation (under which citizens with
particular needs enjoy a statutory right to particular services), and service pledges which articulate
commitment to a basic code of conduct. Beyond the programmatic spending components that are
eﬀectively determined by the central government, local governments have considerable discretion in
how to allocate spending across service sectors and demographic groups. The political power over
discretionary spending is obtained by controlling a majority of seats in local government councils.
Elections with proportional representation of political parties are held every fourth year. Norway has
a multi-party system, which means that parties have to work together to form coalitions. The major
division in shaping electoral preferences and in terms of local government alternatives has been along
the left-right axis, namely between socialists and liberal or conservative parties.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Before turning to the model of local government behavior, we show a few important features of the
Norwegian setting.
We begin by describing the spending pattern on local public services over time and across sectors.
Figure 1 shows that the largest expenditure component is care for the elderly and disabled (long-term
care), closely followed by education. These two sectors account, on average, for more than half of the
total expenditure of municipalities. Taken together, local government spending has increased by 255
percent (after adjusting for inﬂation), from USD 2,320 per capita in 1982 to USD 8,283 per capita
in 2013. The largest increases were in child care (from USD 90 per capita in 1982 to USD 1,186 per
8
capita in 2013) and long-term care for the elderly and disabled (from USD 318 per capita in 1982 to
USD 2,701 per capita in 2013).
The changes over time in spending pattern could be driven by policy reforms, changes in popula-
tion composition, and shifts in local governments' priorities between service sectors and demographic
groups. Figure 2 summarizes the shifts in population composition by household types. The most
important trend is the increasing proportion of single adult households (with or without children),
whereas the proportion of individuals in nuclear families has decreased over time. This is reﬂecting
a secular trend in postponement of marriage and childbearing, a higher rate of divorce, and more
children born by single mothers.
Table 1 complements Figure 1 by showing the cross-sectional dispersion in local government spend-
ing per capita in 1982 and 2013, as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient. In both years, there are fairly
small diﬀerences across municipalities in per capita public spending on education. By comparison,
there was considerable dispersion in municipal spending on the other services sectors in 1982. Over
time, the spending patterns across municipalities have changed signiﬁcantly. In 2013, for example,
there is relatively little dispersion in municipal spending on child care, whereas municipal expenditure
on infrastructure has become much more heterogeneous.
Taken together, the descriptive statistics illustrate the complexity in understanding the spending
pattern of local public services over time, between groups, and across municipalities. In the next
section, we propose a structural model of local government behavior to understand the mechanisms at
work, laying out explicitly the underlying assumptions.
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Figure 1. Mean municipal expenditure per capita by service sector
Note: This ﬁgure displays mean municipal expenditure per capita net of user fees for each service sector in the period
1982-2013. Average measures across municipalities are weighted by municipality size, and expressed in 2013 USD.
Expenditures are adjusted using Norwegian Consumer Price Index and the average 2013 exchange rate of NOK 5.88
per USD is applied. The capital (Oslo) has responsibilities beyond municipal service provision and is therefore excluded
from this ﬁgure.
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Figure 2. Population by household type
Note: This ﬁgure displays the fraction of individuals belonging to diﬀerent household types in the period 1982-2013.
The sample consists of all individuals residing in Norway each year. The household types are deﬁned as follows: Elderly:
households where the youngest is at least 67 years old; Singles: single person households less than 67 years old and
without children; Single parents: single parents less than 67 years old with a child younger than 18 years; Nuclear
families: couples with a child younger than 18 years; Other couples.
Table 1. Heterogeneity in municipal expenditure per capita by service sector
Gini coeﬃcient in municipal expenditure per capita
Sector Year: 1982 Year: 2013
Child care 0.37 0.12
Education 0.13 0.11
Long-term care 0.24 0.16
Health care 0.39 0.25
Social welfare 0.43 0.22
Culture 0.20 0.27
Infrastructure 0.25 0.39
Administration 0.22 0.32
Note: This table displays the Gini coeﬃcient in municipal expenditure per capita net of user fees for each service sector
in 1982 and 2013. The capital (Oslo) has responsibilities beyond municipal service provision and is therefore excluded
from this table.
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3 Measuring extended income
3.1 Model of local government spending
We now derive an empirical model of local government spending behavior that can be microfounded in
the probabilistic voting models of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and the lobbying models by Grossman
and Helpman (1996, 2002). They argue that policies are tilted in favor of interest groups with many
swing voters and/or groups that are able to organize as a lobby. To conform to the institutional setting,
our model distinguishes between the mandatory programmatic spending components (assumed to be
set exogenously by the central government) and the discretionary spending to diﬀerent service sectors
and target groups (endogenously determined by local governments).
Objective function of the local government
Standard models of probabilistic voting and/or lobbying assume that there are K groups of agents,
where each member of a speciﬁc group has the same economic preferences. The indirect utility of
an agent belonging to interest group k is a function of a vector of economic policies chosen by the
political party in power. To choose between political parties, voters consider how they would allocate
discretionary spending to S diﬀerent service sectors and J diﬀerent target groups. Let the utility
Vkm of members of interest group k residing in municipality m be given by the following version of a
Stone-Geary utility function,
Vkm =
S∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
αijklog (xijm − γij) , (1)
where xijm is the production of service i received by members of target group j in municipality m. The
parameter γij is interpreted as the minimum required expenditure per person of service i targeted to
group j, which is often called subsistence expenditure in the literature. These minimum expenditure
parameters are supposed to capture the programmatic spending components for a given service and
target group, determined by the central government. The parameter αijk is a taste parameter of
interest group k for allocating output to service sector i and target group j. As discussed later, our
model allows the interest groups for a given service to diﬀer from the target groups for that service.
As highlighted by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Persson and Tabellini (2002), the equilibrium
policy in models of probabilistic voting and/or lobbying is equivalent to maximization of a weighted
sum of the indirect utilities of the members of the population, where the weights depend on the
political clout of diﬀerent interest groups. Thus the political equilibrium corresponds to maximation
of the following objective function of the local government in municipality m,
Vm =
K∑
k=1
ωkzkmVkm =
K∑
k=1
ωkzkm
S∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
αijklog (xijm − γij) , (2)
where ωk is the political weight assigned to interest group k in the objective function and zkm is the
population proportion that belongs to interest group k in municipality m. The latter term of equation
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(2) is obtained by inserting for Vkm deﬁned by (1).
To deﬁne the marginal budget shares for spending across target groups and service sectors, let the
parameter βijm be given by
βijm =
K∑
k=1
ωkαijkzkm. (3)
Inserting for (3) in (2) yields
Vm =
S∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
βijmlog (xijm − γij) . (4)
The parameter βijm can be interpreted as the marginal budget share for spending on target group j
in service sector i, where marginal budget shares are normalized to satisfy the adding-up constraint∑S
i=1
∑J
j=1 βijm = 1. Note that the target-group-speciﬁc marginal budget share (βijm) for service
sector i and target group j depends on preferences (αijk), political inﬂuence (ωk) and size (zkm) of
the relevant interest groups.
Cost structure
Our model distinguishes between ﬁxed and variable costs in production. We allow for economies of
size in local government service production, arising from spreading ﬁxed costs over a larger volume
of output, thus reducing the average ﬁxed cost per unit. Both ﬁxed and variable costs of service
production are allowed to vary across service sectors, whereas variable costs per unit of production are
assumed to be constant for a given service sector. In order to distinguish between ﬁxed and variable
costs, we assume that expenditure per capita of municipality m in service sector i (uim) is given by
uim = cim + xim, i = 1, ..., S, (5)
where cim and xim are ﬁxed and variable costs per capita in service sector i for municipality m.
The ﬁxed costs are not considered to contribute to the production of services. As a result, the pro-
duction xim in service sector i equals variable costs and is allocated to target groups according to
(xi1m, xi2m, ..., xiJm) where
xim =
J∑
j=1
xijmzjm, i = 1, ..., S, (6)
and zjm is the population proportion that belongs to target group j.
6
6Note that multiplication by zjm changes the normalization of xijm, since xijm is measured per person of the target
group subpopulation, whereas xijmzjm is measured per person of the entire local population. The population breakdown
on J target groups does not necessarily coincide with the partition on K interest groups.
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Budget constraint
The budget constraint requires total incomes (with ﬁxed costs subtracted) to be allocated to spending
on various service sectors. From deﬁnition (5) we get:
ym =
S∑
i=1
uim =
S∑
i=1
cim +
S∑
i=1
xim, (7)
where ym is the income per capita received by local government m. The budget is not necessarily
balanced. We treat any budget surplus as a residual sector of the model.
Expenditure system
By maximizing (4) subject to (6) and (7), the following expenditure system is obtained
xijmzjm = γijzjm + βijm
ym − S∑
i=1
cim −
S∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
γijzjm
 , i = 1, ..., S, j = 1, ..., J, (8)
where γijzjm is minimum variable cost per capita in sector i targeted to group j. Discretionary income
is deﬁned by ym −
∑S
i=1 cim −
∑S
i=1
∑J
j=1 γijzjm, which represents the remaining amount of income
when the local government has covered the ﬁxed costs and minimum variable costs (expenditure needs).
The actual allocation of expenditures to target groups is not observed in the data, which means that
the βijm parameters are not directly identiﬁed. Since the available accounting data for municipalities
are sector speciﬁc (but not target-group speciﬁc) we will use the following aggregate version of the
equation system deﬁned by (8) as the basis for estimating the model parameters,
uim = cim +
J∑
j=1
xijmzjm
= cim +
J∑
j=1
γijzjm + βim
ym − S∑
i=1
cim −
S∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
γijzjm
 , (9)
where
∑J
j=1 γijzjm is the minimum variable cost for service sector i, and βim =
∑J
j=1 βijm is the
marginal budget share for sector i. From (3) it follows that the sector-speciﬁc marginal budget share
βim =
∑K
k=1 ωkαikzkm can be expressed as a weighted average of interest group preferences, where
αik =
∑J
j=1 αijk is a taste parameter of interest group k for service provision in sector i.
Allocation of in-kind transfers
In cases where there is only one target group for a given service sector, the baseline version of our
model assumes that in-kind transfers are allocated equally to all target group members in the same
municipality (see Section 4.3 for a robustness check to this assumption). For many service sectors,
however, there are several target groups. This is challenging because local government accounts give
data on expenditure to diﬀerent service sectors but do not provide direct information on the allocation
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of sector-speciﬁc expenditure to diﬀerent target groups.
To address this problem of missing data, we exploit that the minimum expenditures to diﬀerent
groups are identiﬁed as part of the spending model. Following Aaberge et al. (2010), we can then
assume that the sector-speciﬁc discretionary income is allocated to target groups in the same proportion
as the minimum expenditures,7 i.e.
xijmzjm =
γijzjm∑J
j=1 γijzjm
(uim − cim) . (10)
This means that estimates of the target-group-speciﬁc value of production (xijm) are determined by
estimates of the minimum quantities (γij), the variable costs (uim − cim) and the proportions of the
population (zjm) that belong to various target groups. Note, however, that the variable costs allocated
to a speciﬁc sector and received by the actual target groups depend both on expenditure needs of target
groups and the political inﬂuence of interest groups.
Needs adjustment
Equivalence scales are designed to reﬂect the cost of living of a household of a given size and demo-
graphic composition, relative to the cost of living of a reference household (usually a single adult). As
argued by Radner (1997) and Aaberge et al. (2010), equivalence scales designed to account for needs
and economies of scale in cash income are not necessarily appropriate when analyzing the distribu-
tional impact of public services and inequality in the distribution of extended income. For instance,
the elderly tend to utilize health services more frequently than younger people due to diﬀerences in
health status, whereas children have comparably higher needs for education. As a consequence, studies
using the equivalence scales designed for cash income risk overestimating the equivalent incomes of
groups with relatively high needs for public services.
To account for diﬀerences in needs of various services, we use the cost function approach to justify
the following family of relative equivalence scales introduced by Aaberge et al. (2010):
NAh =
∑S
i=0 γih∑S
i=0 γir
, (11)
where γ0h is the needs parameter of household h for cash income and γih (i = 1, 2, ..., S) is the needs
parameter of household h for public service i. The ratio NAh is the scale factor for household h derived
on the basis of the assessed needs parameters of household h relative to a reference household r.8
Accordingly, equivalent income for household h is given by Ch/NAh, where Ch is the extended income
of household h, i.e. the sum of cash income and the value of local public services that household h
enjoys. Equivalent income can be interpreted as the cost required for attaining the same welfare level for
the reference household as household h enjoys from extended income Ch. Individual needs parameters
7Sector-speciﬁc discretionary income is deﬁned by discretionary income multiplied by the marginal budget share of
service sector i. This approach secures that aggregation from target group to service sector level is consistent with the
allocation of in-kind transfers.
8The reference household r is deﬁned as a single adult, 16-66 years of age, with no household characteristic that
trigger extra expenditure needs.
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are deﬁned by minimum expenditure parameters which are primitives of the demand model (i.e. they
are invariant to changes in the budget constraint of the municipality). Household needs parameters
for publicly provided goods are deﬁned by the sum of the needs parameters of the household members.
To measure the equivalent income of extended income, we also have to deﬁne the needs parameter
(γ0h) for cash income of each household. We follow much of the previous literature in using the EU scale
to account for diﬀerences in needs of cash income for households who diﬀer in size and composition.9
One possibility is to use the poverty line in the distribution of equivalent income in a given year as
a basis for determining the needs parameter for the reference group. Speciﬁcally, we set the needs
parameter γ0r of cash income for the reference household equal to the EU deﬁnition of the poverty line
(i.e. 60 percent of the median equivalent cash income). For households that are not of the reference
type, the needs for cash income is assessed by γ0h = γ0rEUh, where EUh is the oﬃcial European Union
scale for cash income pertaining to household h. Thus, the ratio between the needs for cash income
for household h and for the reference household r deﬁnes the EU scale.
3.2 Empirical implementation
Below, we describe the empirical speciﬁcation, identiﬁcation and estimation of the model.
Empirical speciﬁcation
Our empirical model is described by the system of equations in (9), which accounts for spending on
eleven service sectors, and treats the budget surplus (net operating result) as a residual sector. Thus,
the model can be considered as an extended linear expenditure system.
As is clear from (9), the minimum variable costs (mandatory spending) of diﬀerent service sectors
depend on the size of the targeted population groups, whilst the marginal budget share parameters
depend on the preferences, political inﬂuence and size of various interest groups. A target group is
deﬁned as a group of people considered to have equal needs for public services. The subpopulations
that form the target groups are deﬁned by age groups, refugee status, employment status, marital
status and poverty status. By allowing the minimum expenditure parameters to vary across target
groups, service sectors, and years, the empirical model accounts for diﬀerent needs for public services
between diﬀerent demographic groups and over time.
The sector-speciﬁc marginal budget shares are speciﬁed as parametric functions of the size of the
relevant interest groups. In line with previous evidence, we allow for diﬀerences in the demographic
characteristics of recipients (target groups) and of interests groups supporting spending on a given
service (see e.g. Rubinfeld, 1977; Poterba, 1998; Strömberg, 2006). The reason is twofold. First,
the possibility of altruistic preferences means that voters may support spending on public services to
people other than themselves. For example, parents with young children may support spending on
education services, and adult children with aging parents may be in favor of spending on services that
9The EU scale assigns weight 1 to the household head, 0.5 to each member aged 14 and above and 0.3 to each
member aged below 14. Some studies do not use equivalence scales or, equivalently, assume no economies of scale and
no heterogeneity in needs (see e.g. Piketty et al., 2018).
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are targeted towards the elderly. Second, an increase in government spending on one service sector or
target group may crowd out spending on other service sectors or target groups. For instance, people
who support increased spending on education services may be in favor of spending less on care for the
elderly.
The ﬁxed cost terms in the model equations are speciﬁed as linear parametric functions of inverse
population size and other municipal characteristics. Fixed costs may account for diseconomies of
population dispersion, which occur when there are long traveling distances within a municipal area of
service. Thus, environmental factors such as traveling distances within a municipality will be assumed
to aﬀect ﬁxed costs.
The minimum expenditure term in the equation for budget surplus (net operating result) is speciﬁed
as a function of the (real) per capita income change and lagged income changes from the previous two
years. This speciﬁcation captures that local governments may use budget surplus or deﬁcit to smooth
service production over business cycles.
Identiﬁcation
Our model is a linear expenditure system. Identiﬁcation of this model is discussed in detail in Muell-
bauer (1974), Howe (1975) and Pollak and Wales (1978). In the absence of price variation, the marginal
budget share parameters are exactly identiﬁed without any additional restrictions. However, identiﬁ-
cation of the other parameters require at least one exclusion restriction per variable that is included
in the speciﬁcation of minimum expenditures.
Table 2 lists included and excluded variables that aﬀect minimum expenditures and ﬁxed costs
by sector. As shown in this table, our baseline model speciﬁcation imposes two types of exclusion
restrictions. First, we take advantage of institutional knowledge about target groups per service sector.
As explained in the description of the model, socio-demographic variables are included to capture the
cost of minimum requirements assigned to the relevant target groups of municipal services. Since
regulations and laws enacted by the central government restrict service provision to recipients that
fulﬁll certain criteria, we have direct information that identiﬁes target groups and non-target groups
across service sectors. As a consequence, if group j is a non-target group in service sector i, the relevant
exclusion restriction (γij = 0) is imposed on the sector-speciﬁc minimum expenditure. For example,
since only children in mandatory school-age are enrolled in school, it follows that other age groups are
treated as non-target groups.
The second type of exclusion restrictions exploits that certain environmental factors are unlikely
to matter for the cost of service production in all sectors. For instance, snowfall is assumed to induce
additional costs only in road maintenance, since this service sector is responsible for snow clearing. By
similar arguments, the length of municipal roads and sewage puriﬁcation degree are assumed to increase
ﬁxed costs only in municipal road maintenance and water, sewage and refuse sector, respectively.
Additionally, the eﬀects of inverse population size and average traveling distance are excluded in
service sectors where the estimated eﬀects do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from zero. Finally, there are no
ﬁxed costs associated with the net operating result. Therefore, the minimum net operating result is
assumed to be independent of environmental cost factors.
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As is evident from Table 2, the baseline model is overidentiﬁed. This allows us to estimate a less
restrictive version of the model. The less restrictive model only invokes the ﬁrst type of exclusion
restrictions - which are based on institutional knowledge about target groups - and includes the envi-
ronmental cost factors in all service sectors. If the cost factors are relevant in all service sectors, we
expect the less restrictive model to ﬁt the data better than the baseline model. It is reassuring to ﬁnd
that the goodness of ﬁt, as measured by the adjusted R-squared, diﬀer little if anything between the
baseline and less restrictive model.
Estimation
The system of equations in (9) is estimated based on detailed local government accounts and community
characteristics of Norwegian municipalities for the period 1982 - 2013. The estimates are based on
annual data, but for brevity we only report average estimates over four year periods. Expenditures are
deﬁned exclusive of user fees and employer payroll taxes, and are measured on a per capita basis in the
model speciﬁcation. The model is estimated simultaneously by the method of maximum likelihood,
assuming that the error terms have a multinormal distribution (with mean zero and unrestricted
covariance matrix). Parameter estimates are in general found to be statistically signiﬁcant and of the
expected sign.
Estimates for minimum expenditure parameters (γij), ﬁxed cost parameters (cim), and marginal
budget share parameters (βim) are reported in Appendix A. The parameter estimates in Table A1
show the increase in minimum expenditure by service sector when a given target group is increased by
one person.10
The parameter estimates displayed by Table A2 show the relationship between ﬁxed costs and
municipality characteristics. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs in seven of the eleven service sectors. In
most service sectors, there is a negative relationship between ﬁxed costs per capita and population
size. For the production of mandatory education, health care, and long-term care, the ﬁxed costs per
capita are higher for municipalities with more geographically dispersed population. Additionally, the
ﬁxed costs in municipal road maintenance depend on the length of municipal roads and the amount of
snowfall during the year.
Parameter heterogeneity for marginal budget shares are reported in Table A3. The three basic
interest groups are children aged 0-15, middle-aged 16-59, and elderly people aged 60 and above.11
The marginal budget shares of the average municipality (which are accounted for by constant terms)
tend to be rather stable over time. Consistent with family altruism, the marginal budget shares in
education and in care for elderly increase in the proportion of children aged 0-15 with a grandparent
residing in the same municipality. By contrast, this variable is negatively associated with discretionary
spending on child care services, possibly because grandparents may serve as informal caregivers for
toddlers and pre-school children.
10For the sake of comparability, parameter estimates are standardized by the year- and sector-speciﬁc mean expenditure
per capita. This provides units that are independent of changes in prices and exchange rates over time.
11After including a constant term in the speciﬁcation of marginal budget shares, the group of middle-aged is omitted
and treated as a reference group. Moreover, we measure the population proportions of interest groups as deviations
from yearly mean values, which allows us to interpret the constant terms as the marginal budget shares of the average
municipality.
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Estimates of the eﬀects of income changes per capita on the minimum expenditure in the residual
sector (net operating result) are reported in Table A4. The parameter estimates support the hypothesis
that budget surpluses and deﬁcits are used to attenuate variation in service production over the business
cycle.
As shown in Table 3, our model provides a relatively good within-sample ﬁt for most of the ser-
vice sectors. Reassuringly, the ﬁt is especially good for large service sectors such as long-term care,
mandatory education, and child care. One may, however, be concerned about overﬁtting and spu-
rious correlations, especially in our setting with a relatively large number of explanatory variables.
To assess this, we use the parameter estimates to predict spending behavior of local governments in
the subsequent year. We use the simulated out-of-sample R2 as a summary measure of out-of-sample
prediction performance (for further explanation of this method, we refer to Appendix B). Table 3 com-
pares in-sample and out-of-sample R2 estimates in four-year averages of the data. It is reassuring to
ﬁnd that, in many cases, the out-of-sample prediction performance is as good as the within-sample ﬁt.
The overall impression from the out-of-sample comparison is that the model predicts local government
allocations rather well, at least from one period to the next.
3.3 Descriptive results
By aggregating over service sectors and municipalities in equation (5) we obtain national averages of
ﬁxed costs and variable costs per capita for the period 1982 - 2013, as displayed in Figure 3. The ﬁxed
costs (which do not contribute to the value of the service production) account for 10.9 percent of total
per capita costs in 1982. This share falls to 4.6 percent in 2013. Figure 3 shows that total ﬁxed costs
do not change much over time, while variable costs have more than tripled from 1982 to 2013.12 This
increase in variable costs translates to a growth in the value of in-kind services per capita, from USD
2,121 in 1982 to USD 7,861 in 2013.
There is considerable variation in how much in-kind services that diﬀerent individuals receive,
both across demographic groups, between municipalities, and over time. Figure 4 displays per capita
values of in-kind transfers received by diﬀerent household types.13 The results show that elderly and
families with children receive more public services than single adults and other families, and that these
diﬀerences have become more pronounced over time. Figure 5 complements by showing percentiles in
the distribution of in-kind transfers (per capita) across municipalities. The median value has more
than tripled, from USD 1,921 per capita in 1982 to USD 8,458 per capita in 2013. There is also
considerable dispersion across municipalities in the per capita values of in-kind transfers. In 2013, for
example, in-kind transfers per capita were USD 4,094 higher in a municipality at the 90th percentile
as compared to a municipality at the 10th percentile.
12Service sectors with relatively high ﬁxed cost such as infrastructure and long-term care are partly funded by user
fees (paid with cash income by users). Over time, there has been a considerable increase in user fees. However, this
increase does not translate into a growth in ﬁxed costs because we measure local government expenditure net of user fees
(to avoid double counting in the construction of extended income). To directly examine the impact of excluding user
fees from the calculation of ﬁxed costs, we have re-estimated the model including user fees in local government spending.
The results show that ﬁxed costs inclusive of user fees are indeed growing over time, as one might expect.
13 In-kind transfers are ﬁrst assigned to individuals (based on individual and household characteristics), after which
beneﬁts are aggregated (like other income components) across members within the household. This means that we are
incorporating transfers to elderly even if they live in households with younger relatives. In such cases, however, the
20
T
a
b
le
3
.
R
2
es
ti
m
a
te
s
w
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
a
n
d
o
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
b
y
se
rv
ic
e
se
ct
o
r
S
ec
to
r
E
st
im
a
te
s
1
9
8
2
-1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
-1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
-1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
-2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
-2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
-2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
3
C
h
il
d
ca
re
W
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
0
.4
8
0
.5
1
0
.6
1
0
.6
2
0
.6
3
0
.5
9
0
.6
7
0
.7
5
O
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
0
.4
4
0
.4
8
0
.5
4
0
.5
9
0
.5
9
0
.5
6
0
.6
5
0
.7
4
M
a
n
d
a
to
ry
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
W
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
0
.7
7
0
.7
2
0
.7
6
0
.7
3
0
.7
6
0
.8
2
0
.8
0
0
.7
9
O
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
0
.7
6
0
.6
9
0
.7
3
0
.6
8
0
.7
5
0
.8
1
0
.7
8
0
.7
8
O
th
er
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
W
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
0
.0
5
0
.0
7
0
.1
7
0
.2
2
0
.2
5
0
.2
8
0
.3
2
0
.4
2
O
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
0
.0
3
0
.0
5
0
.1
1
0
.2
0
0
.0
3
0
.2
6
0
.3
0
0
.3
9
L
o
n
g
-t
er
m
ca
re
W
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
0
.5
4
0
.6
8
0
.8
0
0
.8
2
0
.8
5
0
.8
6
0
.8
7
0
.8
6
O
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
0
.5
5
0
.6
4
0
.7
7
0
.8
2
0
.8
4
0
.8
5
0
.8
6
0
.8
5
H
ea
lt
h
ca
re
W
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
0
.2
7
0
.4
2
0
.3
8
0
.5
1
0
.5
9
0
.6
6
0
.7
2
0
.7
1
O
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
0
.2
6
0
.3
9
0
.3
5
0
.4
9
0
.5
8
0
.6
5
0
.7
1
0
.6
9
S
o
ci
a
l
w
el
fa
re
W
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
0
.5
3
0
.5
8
0
.5
1
0
.5
2
0
.5
0
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
4
O
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
0
.5
3
0
.5
1
0
.4
8
0
.5
1
0
.4
3
0
.5
0
0
.4
7
0
.5
2
C
u
lt
u
re
W
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
0
.3
7
0
.4
3
0
.4
7
0
.4
5
0
.4
6
0
.5
2
0
.5
3
0
.4
7
O
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
0
.3
7
0
.4
1
0
.3
8
0
.4
3
0
.4
3
0
.5
0
0
.5
0
0
.4
6
R
o
a
d
m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
W
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
0
.2
9
0
.4
3
0
.5
3
0
.5
7
0
.5
7
0
.5
7
0
.6
1
0
.6
8
O
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
0
.2
3
0
.3
6
0
.5
2
0
.5
5
0
.5
4
0
.5
6
0
.5
5
0
.6
4
O
th
er
in
fr
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
W
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
0
.3
1
0
.4
2
0
.5
5
0
.4
0
0
.4
4
0
.5
1
0
.5
0
0
.4
7
O
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
0
.2
9
0
.3
8
0
.5
0
0
.3
8
0
.4
1
0
.4
7
0
.4
7
0
.4
6
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
W
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
0
.6
7
0
.7
0
0
.7
0
0
.7
2
0
.7
2
0
.7
9
0
.8
4
0
.8
4
O
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
0
.6
7
0
.6
8
0
.6
7
0
.7
2
0
.6
6
0
.7
8
0
.8
2
0
.8
4
N
o
te
:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
d
is
p
la
y
s
fo
u
r-
y
ea
r
av
er
a
g
es
o
f
R
2
es
ti
m
a
te
s
b
y
se
rv
ic
e
se
ct
o
r.
T
h
e
o
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
R
2
u
se
s
p
a
ra
m
et
er
es
ti
m
a
te
s
fr
o
m
th
e
p
re
v
io
u
s
y
ea
r.
T
h
e
o
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
R
2
in
th
e
ﬁ
rs
t
ro
w
d
o
es
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
e
es
ti
m
a
te
s
fo
r
1
9
8
2
.
T
h
is
ex
p
la
in
s
w
h
y
th
e
o
u
t-
o
f-
sa
m
p
le
R
2
is
la
rg
er
th
a
n
th
e
w
it
h
in
-s
a
m
p
le
R
2
in
so
m
e
se
ct
o
rs
in
th
e
ﬁ
rs
t
ro
w
.
S
ee
A
p
p
en
d
ix
B
fo
r
d
et
a
il
s.
21
02,0
00
4,0
00
6,0
00
8,0
00
US
D
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
Year
Variable costs
Fixed costs
Figure 3. Variable cost and ﬁxed costs per person
Note: This ﬁgure displays estimates of per capita ﬁxed costs and variable costs in the period 1982-2013. Average measures
across municipalities are weighted by municipality size, and expressed in 2013 USD. Expenditures are adjusted using
Norwegian Consumer Price Index and the average 2013 exchange rate of NOK 5.88 per USD is applied.
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Figure 4. Value of in-kind transfers per capita by household type
Note: This ﬁgure displays per capita values of municipal in-kind transfers received by diﬀerent household types in the
period 1982-2013. Values of in-kind transfers are expressed in 2013 USD. The values are adjusted using Norwegian
Consumer Price Index and the average 2013 exchange rate of NOK 5.88 per USD is applied. The household types are
deﬁned as follows: Elderly: households where the youngest is at least 67 years old; Singles: single person households less
than 67 years old and without children; Single parents: single parents less than 67 years old with a child younger than
18 years; Nuclear families: couples with a child younger than 18 years; Other couples.
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Figure 5. Value of in-kind transfers per capita by municipality
Note: This ﬁgure displays the median, the 10th percentile, and 90th percentile in the distribution of in-kind transfers
(per capita) across municipalities in the period 1982-2013. Values of in-kind transfers are expressed in 2013 USD. The
values are adjusted using Norwegian Consumer Price Index, and the average 2013 exchange rate of NOK 5.88 per USD
is applied. The municipalities are not weighted by size.
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During the period 1982-2013, Norway experienced a large growth in GDP. In Figure 6, we compare
the aggregate values relative to GDP of i) in-kind transfers provided by the local governments, ii)
payments to old-age pension from the central government iii) other public cash transfers, and iv)
other public in-kind transfers. We ﬁnd that municipal in-kind transfers have become an increasingly
important component of aggregate production over time, making up 4.4 percent of GDP in 1982 and
7.5 percent in 2013. By contrast, there has been little if any change in public old-age pensions and in
spending on other public cash and in-kind transfer programs measured as shares of GDP.
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
.
3
.
35
Sh
ar
e 
of
 G
DP
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
Year
Public cash transfers
Public old−age pensions
Other public spending
Value of municipal production
Figure 6. Public transfers in cash and in kind as shares of GDP
Note: This ﬁgure displays the aggregate values relative to GDP of local government in-kind transfers, other public
in-kind transfers, old-age pensions and other public cash transfers in the period 1982-2013, derived from the national
accounts.
In Figure 7, we decompose the aggregate values of in-kind transfers by service sector. Child care,
mandatory education and long-term care are three important public services. Taken together, they
account for 71 percent of total municipal production in 2013. Over time, long-term care and child care
services are becoming increasingly important, whereas the relative spending on education has declined.
To describe who receives the diﬀerent types of public service, we decompose the sector-speciﬁc in-kind
transfers by target groups. The target groups are usually deﬁned by age and, in many cases, also by
some other characteristic. For example, mandatory education provides education for all children aged
6-15 years (7-15 years before 1998). By comparison, child care services depend on age of the child
and the employment status of the parents. As shown in Appendix Figure A1, child care services were
initially targeted at working parents, but since the late 1990s, all children aged 1-6 years were eligible
for subsidized child care, regardless of parental employment. The shares of long-term care production
household is classiﬁed as other couples.
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Figure 7. In-kind transfers by service sector as shares of total municipal production
Note: This ﬁgure displays the fraction of total municipal in-kind transfers provided by diﬀerent service sectors in the
period 1982-2013. Average values of production across municipalities are weighted by municipality size.
allocated to diﬀerent target groups are displayed in Appendix Figure A2. The elderly receive much of
the long-term care production. After 1991, the mentally disabled are included as a target group in the
model, as local governments were given responsibility for services to this group. In the late 1990s, the
central government granted more funding to local governments that targeted individuals with severe
disabilities (high-need recipients), in need of intensive care.
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4 In-kind transfers and economic inequality
This section examines the impact of in-kind transfers on economic inequality.
4.1 Distribution of cash income versus extended income
Figure 8 displays the evolution of inequality in cash income and extended income, as measured by
the Gini coeﬃcient.14 We consider the distribution of individual equivalent income, using equivalence
scales to compare across households of diﬀerent size, composition and needs. In particular, we follow
the conventional approach and apply the EU scale to deﬁne equivalent income for cash income. By
contrast, our proposed equivalent income measure for extended income employs the NA scale. To
assess the importance of choice of equivalence scales, we also provide results for extended household
income when the EU scale is used to account for diﬀerences in needs both for cash income and in-kind
transfers.
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Figure 8. Gini coeﬃcient in the distribution of cash income and extended income
Note: The solid gray line displays the Gini coeﬃcient for the distribution of household cash income when applying the
EU equivalence scale. The solid black line displays the Gini coeﬃcient for the distribution of household extended income
when applying the NA equivalence scale. The dashed line displays the Gini coeﬃcient for the distribution of household
extended income when applying the EU equivalence scale. The sample consists of all individuals residing in Norway each
year in the period 1982-2013.
The results show that the inequality in cash income, as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient, increased
during the 1980s and into the early 1990s. After the peak in inequality in 1993, inequality declined. In
14In Appendix C, we perform robustness checks to the choices of inequality index. The results are broadly similar if
we apply other inequality measures.
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2013, the Gini coeﬃcient in cash income was 7.0 percent (1.6 percentage points) higher than in 1982.
Extending the income measure to incorporate the value of in-kind transfers reduces the Gini coeﬃcient
by somewhere between 8.0 and 12.1 percent (or 1.9 to 3.1 percentage points). Put into perspective,
this reduction in the Gini coeﬃcient corresponds to introducing a 8 to 12 percent proportional tax on
cash income and then redistributing the derived tax revenue as equal sized amounts to the individuals.
By way of comparison, how one accounts for diﬀerences in needs matters less for the estimates of
inequality: Until the early 1990s, the Gini coeﬃcients in extended income do not diﬀer appreciably
depending on whether we use the EU scale or the NA scale. After 1993, we ﬁnd that adjusting
for diﬀerences in needs for public services attenuates some of the diﬀerences between the estimated
inequality in extended income and cash income.
Focusing attention on the lower part of the income distribution, we also ﬁnd that poverty estimates
are substantially lower for extended income than for cash income measure. According to the EU
deﬁnition, the poverty line is deﬁned as 60 percent of the median equivalent income (see Atkinson
et al., 2012). We use the population share with incomes below this poverty line, or the headcount
ratio, as our measure of poverty. The time trend in poverty is displayed in Figure 9. When including
public in-kind transfers in the income measure, poverty estimates are reduced by 3.6 - 5.2 percentage
points. In 2013, for example, the relative reduction in poverty is 4.4 percentage points when accounting
for the value of in-kind transfers.
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Figure 9. Poverty rate in the distribution of cash income and extended income
Note: The solid gray line displays the share of individuals below the EU poverty line in the distribution of household
cash income when applying the EU equivalence scale. The solid black line displays the share of individuals below the
EU poverty line in the distribution of household extended income when applying the NA equivalence scale. The dashed
line displays the share of individuals below the EU poverty line in the distribution of household extended income when
applying the EU equivalence scale. The EU poverty line is 60 percent of the median income. The sample consists of all
individuals residing in Norway each year in the period 1982-2013.
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Figure 10 breaks down the analysis of distributional diﬀerences according to ﬁve distinct interest
groups. In particular, this ﬁgure reports inequality and poverty estimates for each of these groups.
The Gini coeﬃcient is estimated within each group, whereas the poverty threshold is the same for
all groups (after adjusting for diﬀerences in household size and composition through the equivalence
scale). The poverty rate in cash income is relatively high among elderly and single parents. However,
these groups accrue considerable in-kind beneﬁts, lowering the poverty rate signiﬁcantly. While taking
into account in-kind transfers reduces inequality within each group, the reduction is most pronounced
for single parents.
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Panel B: 2013
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Figure 10. Gini coeﬃcient and poverty rate estimates by household type
Note: The ﬁgure displays the Gini coeﬃcient and the share of individuals below the EU poverty line in the distribution
of household cash income and extended income for various household groups. The Gini coeﬃcient is estimated within
each group, whereas the poverty threshold is the same for all groups. The household groups are deﬁned as follows:
Elderly: households where the youngest is at least 67 years old; Singles: single person households less than 67 years old
and without children; Single parents: single parents less than 67 years old with a child younger than 18 years; Nuclear
families: couples with a child younger than 18 years; Other couples. The sample consists of all individuals residing in
Norway in 1982 and 2013.
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4.2 Contribution by income source
Extended income can be expressed as the sum of total cash income and the value of public services,
while cash income can be divided into four main income components; market income, public old-age
pension, other public cash transfers, and taxes.
Following Rao (1969), the Gini coeﬃcient (G) admits the following decomposition,
G =
5∑
j=1
vj (G) =
5∑
j=1
µj
µ
κj , (12)
where µj is the mean of income component j, µ is the overall mean income, and the ratio µj/µ is the
income share of component j. The concentration coeﬃcient κj can be interpreted as the conditional
Gini coeﬃcient of component j given the rank order in extended income. The inequality contribution
vj (G) is the product of the income share and the concentration coeﬃcient. If the mean of an income
component is positive (µj > 0), then a negative value of the concentration coeﬃcient represents an
equalizing contribution from the income component. A positive concentration coeﬃcient implies that
the contribution is disequalizing. A third case appears when κj = 0, which corresponds to the case
where an equal amount of component q is received by every individual. The inequality share (τj) of
an income component is deﬁned by
τj =
µj
µ
κj
G
. (13)
The decomposition method (12) is applied for the ﬁve income components - market income, public
old-age pension, other public cash transfers, direct taxes and local public services. Taken together,
the income share µj/µ, the concentration coeﬃcient κj , and the inequality share τj describes the
distributional impact of diﬀerent income components.
The decomposition results for extended income are displayed in Figure 11. Market incomes are
shown to be the dominating income component with a clear disequalizing eﬀect on the distribution of
extended income. Since taxes are a negative income component, it follows from the positive concen-
tration coeﬃcient that the progressive nature of the tax system makes the distribution of extended
income more equal. The equalizing contribution of in-kind transfers tends to be smaller than the
equalizing contribution of all public cash transfers (including public old-age pension). Over the last
decade, however, public pension has become less equalizing, reﬂecting that fewer elderly are located in
the lower part of the extended income distribution.
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4.3 Speciﬁcation checks and sensitivity analysis
Below, we discuss and empirically assess a number of key assumptions behind our analysis of the
distributional eﬀects of in-kind transfers.
Valuation of in-kind transfers
As typical in distributional studies of extended income, we have assumed that the market value of
the public services is equal to the cost of providing them. There are several limitions with this pro-
duction cost approach. First, the government may impose quantity constraints in the household's
consumption of public services. The extent to which this issue creates bias in the valuation of in-kind
transfers depends on whether these transfers are infra-marginal or extra-marginal. In cases where in-
kind transfers are infra-marginal, recipients may correct for allocative ineﬃciencies by topping up with
private purchases. Thus, to justify the treatment of in-kind transfers as nondistorting and fungible
with cash income, we may assume that transfers are infra-marginal. If, on the other hand, trans-
fers were extra-marginal and binding, the consequences of public over-provision would be attenuated
if recipients respond by reducing the consumption of substitutes and increasing the consumption of
complements.15 Indeed, the evidence presented in Cunha (2014), Fraker et al. (1995), Hoynes and
Schanzenbach (2009), Moﬃtt (1989) and Slesnick (1996) suggest relatively small consumption distor-
tions from in-kind transfers.
The second problem with the production cost approach is that it abstracts from heterogeneity across
areas and service sectors in the eﬃciency of production activities in the public sector. In our baseline
model, the only step we take to address this concern is by distinguishing between ﬁxed and variable
costs in production, thereby allowing for (but not imposing) economies of scale. We now perform two
robustness checks of the sensitivity of inequality and poverty estimates to additional heterogeneity in
productive eﬃciency.
The ﬁrst robustness check utilizes estimates of local government eﬃciency, reported by the Norwe-
gian Advisory Commission on Local Government Finances.16 These estimates are based on detailed
survey data on the quality and quantity of service production across municipalities. Eﬃciency is
measured as the ratio between quality-adjusted total output and available resources. The average
Eﬃciency Index (weighted by municipality size) is close to 1 and the standard deviation is 0.068. To
account for variation in cost eﬃciency across municipalities, we scale the observed local government
spending with the value of the Eﬃciency Index in each municipality. Appendix Figure A3 shows that
our estimates of inequality and poverty in Norway do not change materially if we adjust for diﬀerences
in cost eﬃciency.
The second robustness check takes advantage of existing research on public sector eﬃciency in
developed countries. Angelopoulos et al. (2008) employ a stochastic production frontier model to
estimate Technical Eﬃciency (TE) of the public sector in a number of developed countries over the
period 1995-2000. The basic idea of this methodology is to compare the government's performance in
15These predictions were ﬁrst formalised in the theory of rationing (Tobin and Houthakker, 1950; Neary and Roberts,
1980; Deaton, 1981).
16For details, we refer to the ﬁnal report from the Norwegian Advisory Commission on Local Government Finances
(2010). See also Borge et al. (2008) who use the eﬃciency estimates to study public service provision in Norway.
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service production to the associated expenditure that the government allocates to these sectors. The
estimate of TE for the public sector in Norway is found to be 0.86, where eﬃciency on the frontier is
equal to 1. As a robustness check, we multiply local government spending by 0.86, thereby deﬂating
the value of the in-kind transfers in accordance with the estimated ineﬃciency in service production.
Appendix Figure A3 shows that our estimates of inequality and poverty in Norway are nearly unaﬀected
if we adjust for public sector ineﬃciency.
While the robustness of our results is reassuring, it is worth noting that our valuation of public
services capture (at best) the corresponding market value of these services. To construct extended
income, we add the measured value of these services to the cash income available for household con-
sumption of goods traded in the market. Inferring the true economic value of goods and services is
diﬃcult, even for market goods. The observed market prices correspond to marginal willingness to
pay, whereas the consumer surplus is the diﬀerence between the (unobserved) highest price a consumer
is willing to pay and the actual market price of the good. In line with much of the existing literature
on economic inequality, we therefore focus on the household's cash and extended income as opposed to
the economic value of the (market and nonmarket) goods and services the household may consume.17
Residential mobility
In spatial equilibrium models, local government in-kind transfers can be understood as a type of local
amenity, as discussed in Moretti (2011). The incidence of this amenity depends on the cost of re-
allocation or mobility. If mobility costs are high - as we have assumed - the incidence of local public
spending will fall on recipients, who enjoy economic rents from increases in the quantity or quality of
publicly provided services. By contrast, if mobility costs are low, more of the incidence may fall on
individuals other than the recipients, such as landowners.
To examine this issue, we investigate whether people move in response to changes in local govern-
ment spending. To address concerns about reverse causality and correlated unobservables, we take
advantage of the instrumental variable proposed in Borge et al. (2015). This study is based on the
observation that much variation in revenues among Norwegian local governments can be explained by
revenues collected from hydropower production. In particular, the authors obtain a plausibly exoge-
nous measure of the income available for public service provision by instrumenting the variation in
local government revenue by interactions between topology and precipitation. Following Borge et al.
(2015), the outcome equation is given by:
vmt = βymt + λwmt + κm + δt + εmt, (14)
where ymt is per capita revenue (USD 1,000) of local governmentm in year t, wmt is a vector of controls
for observable characteristics, and κm and δt denote a full set of ﬁxed eﬀects for municipality and year.
The outcome variable (vmt) of interest in Borge et al. (2015) is an index of local government eﬃciency.
17An alternative approach would be to infer willingness to pay by estimating a model of household demand. This
requires, however, that we observe market prices. Thus, this is only feasible for (the subset of) market goods (for which
we have plausibly exogenous variation in prices), which prevents us from obtaining an overall measure of the economic
value of all market and nonmarket goods and services.
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We simply replace their outcome by a measure of residential mobility, deﬁned by the net inﬂow of
movers to municipality m in year t as a percentage of the total residential population. Otherwise our
speciﬁcation is identical to their model.18 The ﬁrst stage of the IV model is given by the regression
of municipal per capita revenue on the instrument, while including the same set of controls and ﬁxed
eﬀects as in the outcome equation.
Estimation results from the analysis of residential mobility are reported in Appendix Table A5.
Columns (1) and (2) show that both OLS and IV coeﬃcients for total revenue are insigniﬁcant and
small in magnitude. For example, the point estimate in column (1) implies that a one standard
deviation increase in per capita revenue (approximately USD 3,300) of the local government increases
the net inﬂow of movers by 0.3 percentage points. To investigate the possibility of delayed response,
we include the ﬁrst lag of per capita revenue instead of concurrent municipal revenue in Columns
(3) and (4). Accordingly, the ﬁrst stage in Column (4) is modiﬁed by including the ﬁrst lag of the
instrument. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients for lagged per capita revenue also are small and insigniﬁcant.
Taken together, the estimates in Appendix Table A5 suggest little response in residential mobility to
variation across areas in local government revenue.
While it is reassuring to ﬁnd that people do not seem to move signiﬁcantly in response to changes
in local government spending, we cannot rule out that some of the incidence of local public spending
fall on individuals other than recipients. We therefore perform another speciﬁcation check, adjusting
for cost-of-living diﬀerences across areas. This adjustment captures the idea that local amenities,
such as generous public services, could be oﬀset by higher cost of housing (see e.g. Moretti (2013)).
Speciﬁcally, we employ a region-speciﬁc CPI deﬁned by
CPIrt = qtHPIrt + (1− qt) , (15)
where HPIrt is the local housing price index for region r in year t, and qt is the weight that is given
to housing consumption in the yearly Norwegian CPI.19 Following Moretti (2013), we assume that the
cost of nonhousing goods and services do not vary across areas. We employ a classiﬁcation of Norway
in 7 main areas, where each area is further subdivided between urban and rural municipalities, which
yields a breakdown of the country in 14 regions. The local HPI is deﬁned by the average price per
square meter by year and region in the resale market for owner-occupied housing. Household real
incomes are measured by deﬂating nominal incomes by the local CPI.
Appendix Figure A4 displays the level and evolution of inequality and poverty in nominal and real
incomes for cash income and extended income measure. We ﬁnd that inequality is slightly lower when
diﬀerences in the cost of housing across areas are taken into account, whereas the poverty estimates
barely move. Our results indicate that high-income households tend to live in areas with relatively
high cost of housing, which makes the upper part of the real income distributions more compressed
than the nominal income distributions.
18We thank Borge, Parmer and Torvik for sharing their data and code. For more details about the speciﬁcation, see
Borge et al. (2015) Table 2, Columns 5 and 6.
19For extended income measure, the weight of housing in CPI is scaled down by the proportion of cash income in
extended income.
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Allocation and utilization of infrastructure and cultural activities
While our model devotes considerable attention to distributing local government spending across target
groups, within these groups it is assumed that the spending is allocated evenly on a per-capita basis.
This is reasonable for many programs, such as child care, education, and health care. However, for
general spending on public goods, such as that on infrastructure and cultural activities, the proper
distribution of spending within population groups is less obvious. For example, when distributing
federal spending in the U.S., Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2013) shows the results when spending is
distributed both by population and by market income within broad population groups. In a similar
fashion, we now perform a robustness check for assumptions about the allocation (or utilization) of
infrastructure and cultural activities.
In the main speciﬁcation of our model, we assume an equal allocation of spending on infrastruc-
ture and cultural activities within each municipality. In the alternative allocation, we examine how
the results change if we let utilization be higher among more auent families by assuming that in-
kind transfers are allocated proportional to the market income of each household. We ﬁnd that these
alternative assumptions matter little if anything for the estimates of inequality and poverty in the pop-
ulation. The reason is that these service sectors make up relatively little of local government spending.
Additionally, the estimates of poverty and inequality within groups do not depend strongly on the
alternative assumptions about how the services in these sectors are allocated within the population
groups.
4.4 Comparing our ﬁndings to results from a simpliﬁed procedure
Our paper combines Norwegian data from municipal accounts and administrative registers to estimate
a model of local government spending behavior which distinguishes between ﬁxed and variable costs
in production as well as mandatory programmatic spending components versus discretionary spending
on diﬀerent service sectors and target groups. We believe the access to these data sources presents a
rare opportunity to learn about how in-kind transfers provided by local governments aﬀect economic
inequality and poverty.
A natural question is what lessons can one draw from the Norwegian case to other countries. Due
to data availability, it is not possible to give a deﬁnite answer to this question. In most countries, one
only observes the aggregate spending (at the national level) on diﬀerent service sectors. On top of
this, there tends to be little information about composition of recipients in dimensions other than age.
What we can do, however, is to analyze how the estimates from Norway change if we invoke additional
assumptions needed to use the data available in other countries. In particular, we can compare our
main ﬁndings to those we obtain if we do not use the model of local government spending but rather
assume:
i) The recipients are classiﬁed by age only, whereas characteristics other than age are ignored
in the allocation of in-kind transfers
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ii) Within an age group, the in-kind transfer per person is constant across municipalities (for
a given year)
iii) The equivalence scale for in-kind transfers does not diﬀer from the equivalence scale for
cash income (the EU scale)
By combining (i) - (iii), we rely on the type of information about public in-kind transfers that is
available for EU countries and many other countries around the world.20 Figure 12 compares inequality
in extended income based on this simpliﬁed procedure to our main ﬁndings where we do not invoke
assumptions i)-iii). While the time trends are quite similar, the levels of inequality diﬀer. In particular,
using the simpliﬁed procedure understates the inequality in extended income by about 1.5 percentage
points (6 percent).
To understand what causes these diﬀerences, Figure 12 also reports estimates of inequality based
on intermediate cases between the benchmark and the simpliﬁed procedure. As a ﬁrst step, we use the
EU scale (invoke assumption iii)) while maintaining the benchmark procedure for allocating in-kind
transfers (i.e. we do not invoke assumptions i) and ii)). We ﬁnd that the choice of equivalence scale
matters little for the estimates of inequality during the 1980s. Towards the end of the 1990s, however,
the use of the EU scale produces lower estimates of inequality. In this period, the central government
decided that subsidized child care services should be available to all parents, and not only single
parents or families with working parents. The NA scale captures this change in the minimum required
expenditure or needs through the time-varying minimum expenditure parameters. By comparison, the
EU scale does not distinguish between mandatory programmating spending components (set by the
central government to reﬂect minimum required expenditure and needs) and discretionary spending
to diﬀerent service sectors and target grups (endogenously determined by local governments). As a
result, changes in mandatory programmating spending on child care services during the 1990s are
misinterpreted as local governments changing their priorities of discretionary spending towards low
income families.
The second intermediate case we consider invokes assumption iii) and uses the simpliﬁed procedure
for allocation of child care services. All other in-kind transfers are allocated with the benchmark
procedure. Since the recipients of child care services are classiﬁed by age only, the simpliﬁed procedure
misses heterogeneity within age groups. In particular, it fails to capture the disequalizing allocation of
child care spending within age groups and, therefore, understates the inequality in extended income
as compared to the case where child care services are allocated using the benchmark procedure.
20For example, Aaberge et al. (2017) try to incorporate in-kind transfers in a measure of economic inequality in 23
European countries. To this end, they make use of household income data from the EU-SILC survey in combination
with data on the national spending data on child care, education, health care and long-term care provided by OECD.
Taken together, these data sources oﬀer information about government expenditure on various service sectors as well as
the age compositon of receipients for certain services. The recipients are classiﬁed by age, and individuals within a given
age group are assumed to receive the same level of in-kind transfers.
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Figure 12. Inequality in extended income using the benchmark and simpliﬁed procedures
Note: This ﬁgure displays the Gini coeﬃcient for the distribution of household extended income using our benchmark
procedure and a simpliﬁed procedure when recipients are classiﬁed by age only and the equivalence scale for in-kind
transfers does not diﬀer from the equivalence scale for cash income (the EU scale) The dashed line displays inequality
estimates from an intermediate case when extended income is derived using our benchmark procedure and the EU scale
is applied to cash income and in-kind transfers. The dotted line displays inequality estimates from an intermediate case
using the EU scale and the simpliﬁed procedure to allocate child care services. The sample consists of all individuals
residing in Norway each year in the period 1982-2013.
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5 Local government spending and the evolution in inequality
In this section, we use the model of local government spending to quantify the factors behind the
changes in the distribution of extended income over time.
5.1 Factors behind the time trend in inequality
We now examine the factors behind the changes in the distribution of extended income over time. In
particular, our aim is to disentangle the contribution from (i) changes in spending behavior of local
governments, and (ii) changes in population size and composition which aﬀect the spending required
to maintain a given output per person in diﬀerent target groups.
As described in detail in Appendix D, we try to disentangle the impact of these two types of
changes by constructing counterfactual alternatives where municipal priorities are kept constant as in
the base year, while population size and composition are allowed to vary over time according to the
development actually observed. Speciﬁcally, we consider the following counterfactual scenarios where
we in each year:
CF1: Hold priorities within municipalities (across target groups and service sectors) ﬁxed as in
the base year
CF2: Hold priorities between municipalities ﬁxed as in the base year (hold ﬁxed each municipal-
ity's per capita production relative to the national average)
CF3: Hold priorities within and between municipalities ﬁxed as in the base year
For each counterfactual alternative, we obtain a counterfactual distribution of extended income which
can be compared to the actual distribution of extended income. Figures 13 and 14 show these results.
We begin by comparing the counterfactual distribution under CF3 to the actual distribution. This
comparison allows us to draw inference about the joint contribution of changes in priorities within and
between municipalities. When priorities across target groups, service sectors and municipalities are
kept ﬁxed from 1982 to 2013 (CF3), the Gini coeﬃcient in 2013 is about 6.3 percent (1.5 percentage
points) higher than what we actually observe. This suggests that changes in spending priorities had an
economically signiﬁcant impact on economic inequality. Indeed, the reduction in the Gini coeﬃcient
corresponds to introducing a 6.3 percent proportional tax on cash income and then redistributing the
derived tax revenue as equal sized amounts to the individuals.
Next, we compare the counterfactual distributions under CF1 and CF2 to the actual distribution.
The former (latter) comparison is informative about the contribution of changes in priorities within
(between) municipalities, conditional on the priorities between (within) municipalities. Comparing
across the counterfactual income distributions, we can see that much of the reduction in inequality
and poverty can be attributed to changes in priorities across target groups and service sectors.21 By
21The reduction in inequality is mostly due to increased spending on long-term care in the 1980s, and on child care
after 2000.
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Figure 13. Gini coeﬃcient when municipal priorities are ﬁxed as in 1982
Note: This ﬁgure displays measures of the Gini coeﬃcient for actual and counterfactual distributions of household
extended income. The solid black line displays the Gini for the actual distribution. The dotted black line displays
the Gini following from the ﬁrst counterfactual alternative, i.e. the priorities within municipalities are set as in 1982.
The dashed black line displays the Gini following from the second counterfactual alternative, i.e. the priorities between
municipalities are set as in 1982. The solid gray line displays the Gini following from the third counterfactual alternative,
i.e. the priorities within and between municipalities are set as in 1982. The sample consists of all individuals residing in
Norway each year in the period 1982-2013.
comparison, changes in priorities across municipalities contribute much less to reducing inequality and
poverty estimates.
5.2 Robustness to the order of the decomposition
As in most decomposition methods, our approach abstracts from general equilibrium eﬀects and it
is not accounting for labor market responses of individuals to changes in local government spending.
A second general concern with this type of decomposition is that the sequence of counterfactuals
can inﬂuence the results as CF1 through CF3 are evaluated cumulatively. To address this issue, we
investigate the robustness to i) changing the order for ﬁxing priorities, and ii) changing the years for
ﬁxing priorities. It is reassuring to ﬁnd that the results are relatively robust to these changes.
Consider ﬁrst robustness check i). By comparing the counterfactual distributions under CF1 and
CF2 to the actual distribution and adding these contributions together, we obtain similar changes in
inequality and poverty as the joint contribution (CF3) of changes in priorities within and between
40
.
08
.
1
.
12
.
14
.
16
.
18
.
2
Po
ve
rty
 ra
te
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
Year
Actual
Priorities within municipalities fixed (CF1)
Priorities between municipalities fixed (CF2)
Priorities within and between municipalities fixed (CF3)
Figure 14. Poverty rate when municipal priorities are ﬁxed as in 1982
Note: This ﬁgure displays the share of individuals below the EU poverty line in actual and counterfactual distributions
of household extended income. The EU poverty line is 60 percent of the median income. The solid black line displays
the share of poor for the actual distribution. The dotted black line displays the share of poor following from the ﬁrst
counterfactual alternative, i.e. the priorities within municipalities are set as in 1982. The dashed black line displays the
share of poor following from the second counterfactual alternative, i.e. the priorities between municipalities are set as in
1982. The solid gray line displays the share of poor following from the third counterfactual alternative, i.e. the priorities
within and between municipalities are set as in 1982. The sample consists of all individuals residing in Norway each year
in the period 1982-2013.
municipalities. This suggests that the components are approximately additive, and as a result, the
order for ﬁxing priorities do not lead to dramatically diﬀerent conclusions about the contribution of
changes in priorities within and between municipalities.
Moving to robustness check ii), Appendix Figures A5 and A6 display the estimates of inequality
and poverty when the base year is 2013 (last year of our data) instead of using 1982 as the base year
(ﬁrst year of our data). These ﬁgures show that the key conclusion do not depend on the choice of base
year: Changes in spending priorities within municipalities (across target groups and service sectors) is
most important in explaining the reduction in inequality and poverty.
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6 Conclusion
The work of Amartya Sen highlights the importance of incorporating the value of in-kind transfers
in analysis of inequality and when considering the distributional impact of public policy. However,
this has proven diﬃcult for several reasons. While information about aggregate spending on public
services is usually available at the national level, it can be diﬃcult to access data on local government
spending on public services. In federal systems, in-kind transfers are regularly administered by local
governments, which tend to have substantial discretion in spending priorities across service sectors and
demographic groups. Another key challenge is how to value and allocate in-kind transfers across people,
especially since prices and individual recipients are often not observed. On top of this, the equivalence
scales applied to cash income are not necessarily appropriate when including in-kind transfers, because
the receipt of public services is likely to be associated with particular needs. These challenges have
meant that existing empirical research rarely consider the role of in-kind transfers provided by local
governments.
In this paper, we examined how in-kind services provided by local governments aﬀect economic
inequality. The allocation of in-kind transfers to households, and adjustment for diﬀerences in needs
were derived from a model of local government spending behavior. The model distinguished between
ﬁxed and variable costs in production as well as mandatory programmatic spending components versus
discretionary spending on diﬀerent service sectors and target groups. To estimate the model, we
combined Norwegian data from municipal accounts and administrative registers for the period 1982-
2013. We found that economic inequality is considerably lower when taking in-kind transfers into
account. In particular, the poor beneﬁt from receiving a relatively large share of public services.
However, the equalizing eﬀect of in-kind transfers tends to be smaller than the equalizing contribution
from cash transfers. This is not because cash transfers are more important as a share of total income,
but rather the redistributive way in which they are allocated. When examining the time trends
in inequality, we found that local governments attenuated the growth in earnings inequality by re-
allocating in-kind transfers to low-income families. This reduction in inequality is mostly due to
changes in spending priorities across service sectors and target groups, whilst the contribution from
re-allocation of resources across municipalities is much smaller.
Taken together, our ﬁndings may have implications for both policy and research. In particular,
our study highlights that incorporating the value of local public services is important for describing
the distribution of economic well-being and how it evolves over time. Our paper also suggests that
in-kind transfers provided by local governments are an important but largely ignored mechanism of
attenuation to changes in the wage structure.
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A Additional tables and ﬁgures
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Figure A1. Share of production by target group: Child care
Note: This ﬁgure displays how the production of child care is allocated to diﬀerent target groups in the period 1982-
2013. Average shares of production across municipalities are weighted by municipality size. Parents working include
pre-school children of parents who work full time. Parents not working include all other pre-school children.
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Figure A2. Share of production by target group: Long-term care
Note: This ﬁgure displays how the production of long-term care is allocated to diﬀerent target groups in the period
1982-2013. Average shares of production across municipalities are weighted by municipality size. The population is
divided into three age groups (0-66, 67-79, 80+). The mentally disabled and high-need recipients are included as target
groups after 1991 (2000), when local governments were given extended responsibilities and funding for these groups.
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Figure A3. Gini coeﬃcient and poverty rate adjusted for estimates of public sector eﬃciency, 2013
Note: The ﬁgure displays the Gini coeﬃcient and the share of individuals below the EU poverty line in the distribution
of household extended income, and shows how these measures are aﬀected by adjusting for diﬀerences in cost eﬃciency
between municipalities and the Technical Eﬃciency (TE) of the public sector. The sample consists of all individuals
residing in Norway in 2013.
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Figure A4. Gini coeﬃcient and poverty rate in the distribution of cash income and extended income
when adjusting for geographical diﬀerences in cost of living
Note: This ﬁgure displays the Gini coeﬃcient and the share of individuals below the EU poverty line in the distribution
of household cash income and extended income when adjusting for geographical diﬀerences in cost of living (see Section
4.3). The sample consists of all individuals residing in Norway each year in the period 1982-2013.
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Figure A5. Gini coeﬃcient when municipal priorities are ﬁxed as in 2013
Note: This ﬁgure displays measures of the Gini coeﬃcient for actual and counterfactual distributions of household
extended income. The solid black line displays the Gini for the actual distribution. The dotted black line displays
the Gini following from the ﬁrst counterfactual alternative, i.e. the priorities within municipalities are set as in 2013.
The dashed black line displays the Gini following from the second counterfactual alternative, i.e. the priorities between
municipalities are set as in 2013. The solid gray line displays the Gini following from the third counterfactual alternative,
i.e. the priorities within and between municipalities are set as in 2013. The sample consists of all individuals residing in
Norway each year in the period 1982-2013.
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Figure A6. Poverty rate when municipal priorities are ﬁxed as in 2013
Note: This ﬁgure displays the share of individuals below the EU poverty line in actual and counterfactual distributions
of household extended income. The EU poverty line is 60 percent of the median income. The solid black line displays
the share of poor for the actual distribution. The dotted black line displays the share of poor following from the ﬁrst
counterfactual alternative, i.e. the priorities within municipalities are set as in 2013. The dashed black line displays the
share of poor following from the second counterfactual alternative, i.e. the priorities between municipalities are set as in
2013. The solid gray line displays the share of poor following from the third counterfactual alternative, i.e. the priorities
within and between municipalities are set as in 2013. The sample consists of all individuals residing in Norway each year
in the period 1982-2013.
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Table A3. Estimates of marginal budget share parameters
Sector Interest group 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013
Child care Constant .03 .05 .07 .10 .09 .07 .05 .04
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age 015 -.37 -.22 .12 .28 .20 -.02 .02 .19
(.15) (.14) (.21) (.18) (.19) (.26) (.36) (.37)
Age 60+ -.29 -.12 .07 .11 .12 .00 -.13 -.17
(.07) (.06) (.09) (.09) (.10) (.13) (.17) (.15)
Age 015 with grandparent -.19 -.23 -.31 -.13 -.04 -.27 -.31 -.35
in same municipality (.10) (.09) (.16) (.16) (.16) (.19) (.22) (.21)
Mandatory Constant .18 .13 .14 .13 .14 .16 .15 .15
education (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age 015 -.17 -.93 -.33 -.16 -1.17 -1.57 -1.15 -.29
(.53) (.44) (.46) (.41) (.51) (.54) (.59) (.60)
Age 60+ -.44 -.49 -.32 -.09 -.59 -.87 -.35 .01
(.24) (.18) (.18) (.18) (.24) (.25) (.26) (.25)
Age 015 with grandparent .76 .78 .24 .27 .58 .57 .57 .30
in same municipality (.33) (.30) (.32) (.29) (.32) (.32) (.34) (.32)
Other education Constant .02 .02 .04 .05 .04 .02 .02 .02
(.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Age 015 -.19 -.26 -.10 -.20 -.30 -.28 -.33 -.32
(.16) (.15) (.25) (.25) (.26) (.21) (.21) (.18)
Age 60+ -.13 -.04 -.05 -.20 -.11 -.13 -.08 -.07
(.07) (.06) (.09) (.11) (.13) (.10) (.09) (.08)
Age 015 with grandparent .00 -.04 -.26 -.23 .05 .06 .20 .12
in same municipality (.11) (.10) (.18) (.19) (.18) (.15) (.13) (.11)
Long-term care Constant .06 .09 .17 .22 .24 .21 .24 .24
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.03)
Age 015 -.85 -1.3 -1.67 -.83 -.33 .78 -.41 -.94
(.42) (.43) (.68) (.52) (.65) (.81) (.93) (1.12)
Age 60+ .11 -.07 -.01 .14 .06 .33 .57 .05
(.26) (.26) (.38) (.35) (.38) (.42) (.47) (.53)
Age 015 with grandparent .51 .73 1.27 .94 .65 .45 1.01 .51
in same municipality (.28) (.33) (.50) (.39) (.45) (.52) (.60) (.72)
Health care Constant .03 .03 .04 .05 .06 .06 .05 .06
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age 015 -.10 -.26 -.12 -.25 -.13 -.56 -.87 -.66
(.21) (.18) (.28) (.17) (.22) (.28) (.29) (.36)
Age 60+ -.17 -.17 -.03 -.08 -.01 -.26 -.30 -.17
(.10) (.09) (.13) (.09) (.13) (.15) (.15) (.17)
Age 015 with grandparent .06 .24 .06 .15 .20 .34 .53 .45
in same municipality (.13) (.12) (.21) (.15) (.16) (.20) (.18) (.22)
Social welfare Constant .00 .01 .00 .00 .01 .03 .03 .03
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age 015 -.18 -.12 -.30 -.41 -.50 -.78 -.58 -.53
(.18) (.20) (.29) (.27) (.29) (.40) (.41) (.48)
Age 60+ -.07 -.12 -.13 -.18 -.28 -.55 -.40 -.26
(.09) (.09) (.13) (.12) (.14) (.19) (.18) (.22)
Age 015 with grandparent .09 .10 .27 .19 .53 .39 .34 .42
in same municipality (.13) (.15) (.23) (.21) (.23) (.3) (.27) (.33)
Culture Constant .05 .06 .08 .09 .08 .07 .07 .07
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age 015 -.75 -.60 -.14 .11 .09 -.13 -.25 -.03
(.21) (.20) (.22) (.20) (.21) (.24) (.27) (.28)
Age 60+ -.38 -.22 -.09 -.04 .00 -.09 -.13 -.09
(.10) (.08) (.10) (.09) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.12)
Age 015 with grandparent -.12 -.01 -.23 -.27 -.19 -.11 -.11 -.15
in same municipality (.12) (.12) (.17) (.15) (.15) (.17) (.18) (.19)
Road Constant .03 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .03 .03
maintenance (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Age 015 .15 .01 -.03 .00 .07 .17 .28 .35
(.21) (.13) (.13) (.11) (.14) (.18) (.18) (.22)
Age 60+ .14 -.04 -.05 -.04 .03 .18 .14 .09
(.09) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.09)
Age 015 with grandparent -.03 -.04 .14 .15 .04 .00 -.12 -.22
in same municipality (.14) (.09) (.11) (.09) (.10) (.12) (.12) (.14)
Water, sewage Constant .01 .02 .03 .03 .01 .00 .00 .00
and refuse (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age 015 .30 .36 .34 .56 .39 .61 .53 .59
(.25) (.27) (.31) (.26) (.30) (.41) (.36) (.34)
Age 60+ .19 .14 .10 .20 .10 .27 .25 .32
(.13) (.12) (.13) (.12) (.15) (.19) (.19) (.17)
Age 015 with grandparent -.10 .03 .25 .32 .15 .00 -.08 -.12
in same municipality (.13) (.14) (.21) (.20) (.21) (.28) (.22) (.22)
Other Constant .08 .08 .11 .06 .07 .10 .09 .09
infrastructure (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age 015 -.32 -.43 -.24 -.36 -.02 .02 .17 .39
(.30) (.29) (.41) (.43) (.46) (.51) (.46) (.46)
Age 60+ -.09 -.07 0.00 -.09 .11 .23 .16 .21
(.14) (.12) (.19) (.21) (.22) (.25) (.24) (.20)
Age 015 with grandparent .11 .32 .50 .32 -.01 -.06 .18 .28
in same municipality (.20) (.20) (.30) (.33) (.30) (.33) (.31) (.30)
Administration Constant .06 .06 .08 .10 .12 .15 .15 .13
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Age 015 -.15 -.39 .09 -.04 .20 .12 .10 .24
(.19) (.20) (.29) (.23) (.40) (.49) (.54) (.62)
Age 60+ -.12 -.11 .02 .13 .31 .48 .17 .39
(.08) (.11) (.14) (.12) (.22) (.26) (.29) (.32)
Age 015 with grandparent -.13 -.05 -.61 -.47 -.50 -.38 -.45 -.43
in same municipality (.12) (.14) (.25) (.18) (.28) (.35) (.28) (.33)
Note: This table displays four-year averages of estimates of the political inﬂuence of interest groups on the marginal
budget shares of diﬀerent service sectors. Four-year averages of standard errors are in parentheses. Population propor-
tions of interest groups are measured as deviations from yearly mean values across municipalities. Hence, constant terms
provide estimates of the marginal budget shares of the average municipality.
Table A4. Eﬀects of income changes on the net operating result
1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013
Contemporaneous .59 .6 .45 .56 .54 .57 .6 .48
income change (.06) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.06)
Previous year's .37 .41 .17 .31 .36 .29 .43 .26
income change (.06) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.07)
Income change .17 .21 .03 .13 .12 .15 .23 .09
two years ago (.05) (.06) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.06)
Note: This table displays four-year averages of estimates of how change in income aﬀect net operating results. Four-year
averages of standard errors are in parentheses. Per capita income changes are measured as deviations from yearly mean
values across municipalities.
Table A5. The eﬀect of total revenue on residential mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
Panel a) First stage
Coeﬃcient on instrument 0.009 0.009
Standard error (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Panel b) Outcome equation
Coeﬃcient on per capita revenue 0.086 0.328 0.034 0.386
Standard error (0.146) (0.681) (0.143) (0.613)
Speciﬁcation with lags No No Yes Yes
N 2579 2579 2165 2165
Note: Columns (1) and (2) show OLS and IV coeﬃcients for total revenue (USD 1,000) and Columns (3) and (4) show
OLS and IV coeﬃcients for lagged total revenue (USD 1,000). The analysis uses data for 2001-2007, as the instrument
is available only for this period.
B R2 out of sample
We estimate expenditures out of sample by inserting parameter estimates from year b (base period)
into (9) when the right-hand-side variables are from year t:
uˆimt (b) = cˆimt (b) +
J∑
j=1
γˆijbzjmt + βˆimt(b)
ymt − S∑
i=1
cˆimt (b)−
S∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
γˆijbzjmt
 , (B1)
where
cˆimt (b) =
∑
l
φˆilbqlmt, (B2)
βˆimt(b) = βˆi0b +
∑
k
βˆikb (zkmt − z¯kt) , (B3)
where qlmt is ﬁxed cost variable l of municipality m in year t, and φˆilb is a corresponding parameter
estimate for sector i in the base year b. Futhermore, the marginal budget share constant term estimate
of sector i in year b is denoted βˆi0b, whereas the marginal budget share parameter of interest group k
in service sector i is denoted βˆikb when estimated on data for year b. The population proportions of
interest groups are measured as deviations from yearly mean values (z¯kt), which implies that constant
terms account for the marginal budget shares of the average municipality.
We use R2 to evaluate how much of the expenditure variation in a given year that is captured by
the out of sample estimates:
R2it (b) = 1−
∑M
m=1 (uimt − uˆimt (b))2∑M
m=1 (uimt − u¯it)
2 , (B4)
where
u¯it =
1
M
M∑
m=1
uimt. (B5)
Table 3 displays four-year averages of the within-sample R2it(t) and the out-of-sample R
2
it(t− 1) when
using parameter estimates from the previous year (b = t− 1) to predict expenditures in year t.
C Sensitivity to choice of inequality measure
To complement the information of inequality provided by the Gini coeﬃcient we employ two closely
related rank-dependent measures of inequality (C1 and C3) discussed by Aaberge (2007) and deﬁned
by
Ck = 1− 1
µ
∫ 1
0
pk(u)F
−1(u)du, (C1)
where
pk(u) =

−logu, k = 1
k
k−1
(
1− uk−1) , k = 2, 3,
(C2)
and µ and F−1(u) denote the mean and the left inverse of F . Whilst it can be shown that the Gini
coeﬃcient (C2) tends to pay most attention to changes that occur in the middle part of the income
distribution, the two alternative measures of inequality are shown to be particularly sensitive to changes
that occur in the lower part (C1) and the upper part (C3) of the income distribution.
As shown in Figure C1, the evolution of cash and extended income inequality described by C1 and
C3 are similar to the results for the Gini coeﬃcient given by Figure 8. However, the diﬀerence in cash
income inequality and extended income inequality is somewhat larger for the measure that is most
sensitive to changes in the lower part of the income distribution.
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D Decomposition method
We start with a decomposition of municipal production. In each year t, we aggregate in-kind transfers
across service sectors for each target group, across target groups within municipalities, and across
municipalities:
xjmt =
S∑
i=1
xijmt, j = 1, ..., J, (D1)
where xijmtis the average production value of service i for members of target group j in municipally
m.
xmt =
J∑
j=1
xjmtzjmt, (D2)
xt =
M∑
m=1
nmt
nt
xmt, (D3)
where nmt is the population size of municipality m in year t and nt is the total population of the
country in year t. Note that xjmt is the production value per member of target group j living in
municipality m, xmt is the production value per capita in municipality m and xt is the production
value per capita in Norway.
Based on equations (D1), (D2) and (D3), we next deﬁne two proportions which describe the allo-
cation of municipal production at diﬀerent levels of aggregation:
1. The share of production in municipality m allocated to target group j,
s1jmt =
xjmtzjmt
xmt
, j = 1, ..., J, m = 1, ...,M, (D4)
2. The share of total municipal output produced by municipality m,
s2mt =
nmtxmt
ntxt
, m = 1, ...,M, (D5)
Let Ajmt denote the aggregate value of production received by target group j in municipality m in
year t. By inserting (D4) and (D5) in Ajmt we ﬁnd that Ajmt admits the following decomposition,
Ajmt = nmtxjmt = s1jmts2mtntxt, (D6)
from which it follows that the production value per recipient in target group j is given by xjmt =
Ajmt/nmtzjmt. Note that nmtzjmt is the number of members of target group j in municipality m in
year t. Thus, the actual value of production received by target group j in municipality m in year t has
been decomposed multiplicatively by the two proportions (D4) and (D5).
For (D4) and (D5), we deﬁne counterfactual alternatives where municipal priorities are kept as
in base year b, while population size and composition are as in year t. For (D4), which pertains to
allocations to target groups (and service sectors), the counterfactual is given by
s1jmt(b) =
xjmbzjmt
xmt(b)
=
xjmbzjmt∑J
j=1 xjmbzjmt
, (D7)
where s1jmt(b) is the counterfactual share in year t of production in municipality m allocated to target
group j when year b is deﬁned as the base year, and xmt(b) =
∑J
j=1 xjmbzjmt is the counterfactual per
capita production in municipality m with production per person in diﬀerent target groups as in year
b and population as in year t.
For (D5), regarding allocation to municipalities, the counterfactual is given by
s2mt(b) =
nmtxmt(b)
ntxt(b)
=
nmt
∑J
j=1 xjmbzjmt
nt
∑M
m=1(nmt/nt)
∑J
j=1 xjmbzjmt
, (D8)
where xt(b) =
∑M
m=1(nmt/nt)
∑J
j=1 xjmbzjmt is the counterfactual municipal per capita production in
the whole country with production per person in diﬀerent target groups as in year b and population
as in year t.
By combining the actual shares in (D4) and (D5) with the counterfactual shares in (D7) and (D8),
we can deﬁne diﬀerent counterfactual scenarios. By focussing on changes in priorities within and
between municipalities, we may study both the partial impact of each factor and their combined eﬀect
on the distribution of extended incomes. Thus we deﬁne the following counterfactual alternatives:
CF1jmt = s1jmt(b)s2mt(t)ntxt, (D9)
CF2jmt = s1jmt(t)s2mt(b)ntxt, (D10)
CF3jmt = s1jmt(b)s2mt(b)ntxt. (D11)
For each counterfactual alternative, we obtain a counterfactual distribution of extended income which
can be compared to the actual distribution of extended income.
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